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Summary
This paper analyzes the characteristics of Dutch pay arrangements. We show that (1) studying
executive compensation outside the Anglo-American countries adds insights to the pay for per-
formance literature, (2) pay for performance relations are different for various types of executives
and for various compensation components, (3) attention to the methodological treatment of con-
ditional stock (option) grants is important, and (4) researchers should go beyond stock market
performance indicators to detect the performance relatedness of pay. All in all, a myriad of pay-
performance relationships has been found for the Dutch case, when the above is accounted for.
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1 INTRODUCTION
For the Anglo-American world, the debate about the level, structure and
role of executive pay in different countries triggered considerable academic
interest (Bebchuk and Fried 2003). According to Murphy (1999: 1), “CEO
pay research has grown even faster than CEO paychecks.” In continental
Europe, however, the public outrage over executive compensation is fuelled
regularly by new events, too. For instance, in 2000, former top managers
of Mannesmann were accused of having distributed take-over premiums of
about C 60million among themselves. Similarly, in 2006, public discontent was
expressed when the German multinational firm Siemens announced a 30 per
cent rise in managerial pay amid lower profits and job cuts. Likewise in The
Netherlands, strong criticisms were raised against the total compensation of
top executives of listed corporations such as Royal Dutch Shell, Heineken,
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Reed Elsevier, Unilever and Van der Moolen, which paid their top manag-
ers considerable bonuses irrespective of their meagre performance in 2004. In
2006, the national Monitoring Committee on Corporate Governance in The
Netherlands expressed its concern about the lack of transparency on executive
compensation policies and sums of Dutch listed firms. And finally, Bebchuk
and Spamann (2003) argue that share-based incentive plans stimulated exces-
sive risk taking in the banking sector, which may have contributed to the inci-
dence of the financial crisis in 2008.
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the idea that executive compensation
should be aligned with shareholder interest, and hence corporate performance,
has gained a strong foothold in economics, finance, and management research.
The executive compensation literature has since taken two routes to test the
notion contained in Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory (Devers et al. 2007).
First, several studies have been conducted to assess behavioral and perfor-
mance effects of performance-related pay. These studies find, for example, that
CEOs who are largely paid in stock options tend to take more risky deci-
sions (Certo et al. 2003; Sanders and Hambrick 2007; Bebchuk and Spamann
2003). Second, research into the performance relatedness of executive pay
has been conducted: is actual executive pay indeed positively related to com-
pany performance (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Hall and Liebman 1998;
Jensen and Murphy 1990)? Our analysis of Dutch executive compensation
contributes to the latter stream of research.
This study offers a fourfold contribution to the existing literature. First, as
of today, executive compensation practices have been widely investigated, in
particular in the US and somewhat less so in the UK. However, there still
is little systematic evidence on the pay packages received by top managers in
other countries (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998; Devers et al. 2007). Results
of these US-UK studies are translated into policy prescriptions throughout
the world, largely disregarding local conditions. Analyzing executive compen-
sation in alternative institutional settings may further improve our under-
standing of how these factors may affect executive compensation. The Dutch
case is much more representative for continental Europe, where in compar-
ison to the US-UK practice compensation is not so much dominated by
stock-based pay components. So, with Dutch data, we can investigate whether
US-UK findings can indeed be translated to another context.
Second, our analysis is at a level of detail that goes unprecedented for the
Dutch case, and is rarely seen in pay for performance research, to date, gen-
erally. We have collected compensation information for all executives in most
listed corporations in The Netherlands over a five-year period (2002–2006).
With the exception of pension plans, virtually all compensation arrangements
have been taken into account. Consequently, we distinguish among, broadly,
salary, bonus, stock options and share plans. Moreover, our analyses of
pay-performance sensitivity include both the components of pay, and total
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pay. After all, different compensation elements may well be used to stimulate
a variety of corporate outcomes, implying that the pay-performance relation-
ship might therefore be different for the various components of pay.
Third, for stock options and share plans, the conditionality of grants is
taken on board. Unlike in the US, in The Netherlands, grants are often made
under the condition that pre-specified performance targets are met over the
course of – generally – 3 years. Other stock-based compensation types may
not be conditional, but the executive is not allowed to exercise the option or
sell the stock before a pre-specified date. Based upon these restrictions, the
expected value of executive stocks or stock options will be lower than the
unconditional market value of these assets. We take these restrictions on sell-
ing or exercising stock-based compensation and the conditionality of grants
into account, and thus further specify the definition of long-term compensa-
tion as it has been used by, for example, Hall and Liebman (1998).
Fourth, and finally, the ultimate performance variable is usually taken to be
the change in shareholder wealth, often referred to as shareholder value. For
example, the oft-cited Jensen and Murphy (1990) pay-performance sensitivity
indicator is based on this criterion. For our study, we analyzed the annual
reports for half of the companies in the sample, and elicited the most impor-
tant performance criteria. In contrast, researcher-selected performance criteria
were used in the few studies of Dutch executive compensation (for example,
Duffhues and Kabir 2008; Otten et al. 2008). Consequently, our study explic-
itly focuses on the multiplicity of performance criteria, exploring how this
may affect the pay-performance relationship. Below, we first introduce extant
theory, before introducing our methodology, data and evidence.
2 THEORY
2.1 Introduction
The compensation packages of top managers of listed companies can be
extremely complicated. In their conceptual framework, Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia (1998) distinguish three broad categories of pay level, long-term
orientation, and pay-for-performance predictors, each including many
determinants: compensation criteria, governance characteristics, and other
contingencies. We distinguish fixed payments from variable (performance cri-
teria-based) pay components. In analyzing the pay-performance link, it is
important to distinguish the influence of performance on pay (i.e., ex post
compensation) from the influence of pay on performance and behavior (i.e.,
ex ante compensation). The former determines the actual pay-performance
link, based upon actual or realized performance.
This paper focuses on ex post compensation, seeking to determine the
extent to which this is related to realized performance. As the current state
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of the art is largely based on the available US evidence, the theoretical back-
ground we formulate below provides a benchmark only, as we cannot be sure
that the American evidence can simply be transplanted to the Dutch context.
In the empirical part of our study, we further explore the anticipated effect of
corporate performance on executive pay for our Dutch companies in order to
be able to discuss our results in view of the literature, reflecting on the impli-
cations of the idiosyncrasies of a non-American setting such as the Dutch. In
the Subsections 2.2 up to 2.4, the relevant pay for performance literature is
discussed for fixed pay, short-term variable pay and long-term variable pay,
respectively. Subsection 2.5 discusses the need for replication, as well as the
findings of prior Dutch pay for performance studies.
2.2 Fixed Pay
Salary is defined as a fixed amount of cash, with the level being set at the
beginning of a year. To explain developments in the level of salary, variables
related to market, industry, company, task, and personal characteristics have
been used (e.g., Jacobsen and Skillman 2004; Rosen 1992). Most pay for per-
formance studies posit no expectations with respect to the performance sen-
sitivity of fixed pay. Indeed, only indirect effects of performance on fixed pay
may emerge. For example, the introduction of variable pay increases the risk
an executive faces. This translates in a risk premium that may become appar-
ent as an increase in fixed pay in case executives are risk averse. Also, in the
longer run, variable pay may increase the wealth of executives as a group, and
thereby boosts the reservation price a company faces when hiring an execu-
tive. All in all, however, it seems unlikely that a direct pay-performance rela-
tionship will exist for fixed pay.
2.3 Short-Run Variable Pay
Executive compensation is usually determined as the result of a complex bar-
gain between the corporation and the (candidate) executives (Gomez-Mejia
and Wiseman 1997). In this bargain, the rationale for the pay-performance
link emerges as a result of the asymmetry of information between corporate
representatives and (candidate) executives. Following principal–agent theory,
the objective of compensation contracts is to align the interest of executives
and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Thus, the contracting approach
argues that compensation schemes are a solution to principal-agent prob-
lems. In this respect, the board of directors serving the interests of the share-
holders offers compensation packages that provide efficient incentives to the
executives to maximize shareholder value (Murphy 1999). “The optimal con-
tract does not imply a ‘perfect’ contract, only that the firm designs the best
contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the
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manager, given the contracting constraints it faces” (Conyon 2006: 25). In the
contracting approach, the relationship between corporate performance and
executive compensation thus reflects the reward for prior good performance
and executive behavior (Devers et al. 2007).
In the design of performance-related pay, short-term variable compensation
is generally distinguished from long-term variable compensation. Short-term
variable compensation (or bonus) is determined at the end of the year, and
based on prior quantitative and/or qualitative performance criteria, which are
set at the beginning of the year (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). This short-term
variable compensation is generally paid out in cash, and used to motivate
executives through accounting measures of corporate performance, and qual-
itative indicators relating to, e.g., strategy implementation. The argument to
use accounting measures is that they are more directly influenced by execu-
tives, whereas market measures are generally affected by many factors out-
side the direct control of executives as well (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997;
Murphy 1999). The informativeness of performance criteria is crucial, which
creates space for additional performance indicators besides market value ones
(Holmstro¨m 1979).
In this respect, the conceptual distinction between line of sight and goal
agreement is relevant (Baker 1992). Accounting measures can be more directly
controlled by executives, and thus are generally characterized by a high line of
sight. Market values generally reflect higher levels of goal agreement between
executives and shareholders. The more direct executive control and the
increased informativeness of performance measurement come, in principle, at
the cost of the increased ability to manipulate accounting measures. The over-
whelming focus of the pay for performance literature on market values thus
implies an emphasis on goal agreement between the executives and the share-
holders, but neglects the extent to which executives can actually influence
these outcomes.
Finally, accounting measures of performance reflect current and past per-
formance, and thus are backward looking. In contrast, the market valua-
tion of corporate performance will also reflect anticipated future performance
(Devers et al. 2007). Since the anticipation of future earnings and actual earn-
ings do not have to coincide (Morgan and Poulson 2001), the effect of these
variables on executive compensation can also be expected to be different. As a
result, we would expect short-term variable compensation (bonus) to be par-
ticularly affected by accounting measures of corporate performance.
2.4 Long-Term Variable Pay
The overwhelming majority of studies in the pay-performance literature focus
on long-term variable compensation. Long-term variable compensation is cal-
culated as the annualized present value of any cash or cash-equivalent, based
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on outcomes over a period longer than 1 year (Abowd and Kaplan 1999).
Long-term variable compensation includes stock options, restricted stocks,
stock appreciation rights, phantom stock plans, performance unit plans
awards, and performance share plans. The available empirical evidence on
pay for performance is widely documented, both from an economics and
finance perspective, as well as from an organization and management theory
angle (e.g., Devers et al. 2007; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Jensen and
Murphy 2004; Murphy 1999). Notably, all these studies, to a large extent,
reflect on analyses based on US samples. The seminal paper in the pay-perfor-
mance literature is Jensen and Murphy (1990). In their research, they found
that most of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) comes from stock ownership.
Nevertheless, PPS is too small to support the principal-agent theory.
Subsequently, Hall and Liebman (1998) criticized the Jensen and Murphy
approach because of (a) the time-period under study and (b) the neglect
of CEO stock holdings in their analysis. After correcting both weaknesses,
their results clearly indicated stronger pay-performance sensitivity (Hall and
Liebman 1998). Following these seminal papers, several studies addressed the
pay-performance link in more detail. For example, in a series of papers,
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a,b, 2003) study the effects of performance char-
acteristics, such as the volatility of market returns and relative performance
indicators, on PPS. Others investigate the relevance of performance surprises
(e.g., Baber et al. 1998) and the effect of governance structures (e.g., Conyon
and Peck 1998). Devers et al. (2007) offer a detailed discussion of this stream
of work. Here, it is relevant to note an additional improvement to the Hall
and Liebman (1998) methodology: research should acknowledge that grants
are sometimes conditional on the realization of performance targets during
the vesting period. For such grants, the number of options or shares that is
effectively granted depends on the extent to which targets are met. As some
of these targets may be more competitive than others, it is salient to calculate
the expected number of granted options or shares.
2.5 Need for Replication
To conclude, we observe that the labor market model of executive compensa-
tion primarily provides a description of the complex bilateral bargain regard-
ing fixed salary. Considering the bargaining process as to the variable
executive pay components, conclusive empirical evidence of strong pay for
performance is lacking. Moreover, both the familiar pay-performance sensitiv-
ity indicator (i.e., the Jensen–Murphy statistic) and the Hall–Liebman alterna-
tive emphasize changes in shareholder wealth. Additional detail is needed in
order to grasp the multiple pay-performance linkages between different pay
components, on the one hand, and alternative market-based and accounting-
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based performance indicators, on the other hand, that characterize compen-
sation policies in continental Europe.
Research into the performance sensitivity of compensation in Dutch listed
companies is scarce. Duffhues and Kabir (2003, 2008) and Cornelisse et al.
(2005) study executive compensation at the end of the 1990s and the early
2000s. As there was no legal obligation then to publish compensation infor-
mation (see “Dutch Corporate Governance System”), their studies are com-
plicated by large numbers of missing values. Potentially, firms self-select into
publishing compensation figures motivated by reasons related to the topic
of this paper, and therefore their results may not generalize to the period
after which this legal obligation was installed – i.e., 2002. The findings of
Cornelisse et al. (2005) point at weak pay-performance relationships, at best.
More recently, Otten et al. (2008) also analyzed the performance sensitivity
of compensation for the 1996–2005 period. Using data distributed by a com-
pensation consultant for the years prior to 2002, they are not able to find
large performance sensitivities either. These studies, however, do not control
for cross-sectional heterogeneity and individual effects. Long-term incentive
pay has also not been comprehensively studied in prior work.
3 DATA AND METHOD
3.1 Dutch Corporate Governance System
The Dutch system of corporate governance contains three key sets of actors:
managers and supervisory board members, shareholders, and other stakehold-
ers (i.e., financial intermediaries, workers and other firms). More detailed
descriptions of the system of corporate governance and finance in The
Netherlands can be found in, for instance, De Jong (2001); Poutsma and
Braam (2005), and Van Ees and Postma (2005). Here, we summarize the sys-
tem’s core.
The focal point of the Dutch corporate governance system is a two-tier
board structure, consisting of an executive management board (Raad van
Bestuur), in charge of the day-to-day operations of the firm, and a non-
executive supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen). Members of the
supervisory board are appointed for four-year terms by the annual meeting of
shareholders. From October 2004 onwards, the workers’ council has the right
to a binding nomination of at most one third of the supervisory board’s mem-
bership. In The Netherlands, industry or class-based unions are not allowed
to directly participate in supervisory boards. The mean number of members
on the supervisory and management boards is slightly more than five and
three, respectively (Spencer Stuart 2005). An individual cannot serve on both
boards of the same company. The management board, and in particular the
CEO, has a large influence on appointments to the supervisory board (Van
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der Goot and Van het Kaar 1997). Inside (managerial) ownership of listed
firms is unimportant in The Netherlands.
Shareholders/investors exercise voice through voting at the annual meet-
ing (Algemene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders). In considering voting rights
in The Netherlands, it is important to bear in mind that, with the excep-
tion of the largest corporations listed on Euronext Amsterdam, most (smaller)
Dutch corporations limit the voting rights of their shareholders. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, Dutch institutional investors held substantial equity stakes.
However, from 2002 onwards, their stakes are declining and increasingly taken
over by large foreign investor companies, which tend to be substantially less
patient investors.
The Tabaksblat committee, representing the Dutch government, the Dutch
shareholder association, Euronext Amsterdam and the Dutch employers’ orga-
nizations, was assigned the task to establish a Dutch corporate governance
code. This Tabaksblat code came into effect in January 2004 (Akkermans
et al. 2007). In addition, from the fiscal year 2002 onwards, Dutch listed
companies are required by law to disclose remuneration details of individual
executives. Taken together, these institutional changes have resulted in a con-
siderable increase in transparency and disclosure of company information of
Dutch listed corporations from 2002 onwards.
Dutch practice is different from that in both Germany and the US. Dutch
corporate law forbids insiders to hold a position on the supervisory board,
but quasi-insiders (experts and other non-employee members who act in the
interest of the incumbent management) frequently sit on Dutch supervisory
boards. In about 25 per cent of the non-financial and non-service companies,
a network tie exists between the supervisory board or management board of
this firm and the supervisory board or management board of a financial inter-
mediary (Chirinko et al. 2004), although the role of the financial sector seems
to be diminishing vis-a`-vis the capital market (Heemskerk et al. 2003).
3.2 Sample and Model
A dataset of all executives in 107 stock-listed Dutch companies in 2002–2006
was hand-collected. Information on fixed pay, cash bonuses, stock options,
share grants and portfolios, and other compensation types was derived from
the annual reports of these companies. Firm performance data was taken
from Thompson Financial’s Datastream database. We recorded compensation
information from 2002, as since then the reporting of individual executive
compensation details for all statutory members of the management board is
required. Data collection took place in the period following the publication
of the last 2006 annual reports, in the summer of 2007.
The Dutch stock market is characterized by relatively few listings and a
large variety in underlying corporate activities. We therefore aimed to include
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all listed firms in our sample. An initial count of all listed companies by April
1st 2002–2006 resulted in 177 listings. Several companies were not included
in the sample because their primary listing was elsewhere, and there was
no material business activity in The Netherlands. Executives in these corpo-
rations would probably not conform to Dutch pay practices. Also, it was
required that corporations were listed for at least 3 years in the sampling
period. Because of information availability, a further requirement was that at
least two of these listings should be in or after 2004. As a consequence of our
estimation method (see Section 3.5), corporations with fewer listings would
be removed from the sample, giving cause to the above requirements. Thus,
companies that de-listed in 2004 but were listed throughout 2002–2004, as
well as companies that were listed as of 2005 or later, are not included in the
sample. For the former, information would be difficult to obtain; for the lat-
ter, the observation window is too short to draw meaningful conclusions. In
the end, 117 corporations remained in the target sample. Annual reports for
all these companies were analyzed. Whenever annual reports were not found,
the company was contacted and the reports were requested. The final sample
consists of 107 corporations. Compensation information was derived from the
annual reports for all statutory executives sitting on the 107 companies’ man-
agement boards. This resulted in 1,695 observations on 543 executives. Out of
these, 170 (31 percent) were in the board throughout the observation window,
whereas 325 (60 percent) are mentioned at least for 3 years in a row.
The deletion of 30 non-Dutch companies furthers a clear definition of the
sampling frame, and is likely to make our results more generalizable for the
Dutch context. For statistical and informational purposes, however, 40 addi-
tional companies were removed, which may imply a sampling bias. The main
reasons for de-listings may, after all, be either bankruptcy or merger. Both
events are likely to emerge in situations of performance extremity. Although
this may theoretically hamper the interpretations of our results, we note that
the relevant population of 147 Dutch companies accounted for 685 listings
in 2002–2006, whereas our sample includes 523 listings for 107 companies
(76 percent of the population). Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted
with this sample bias in mind.
We estimate the following regression model for executive i in corporation j
at time t:
COMPgi jt =β0 +β1*SIZE jt +β2, . . . , β5*PERF jt + ε j t , (1)
where COMPgi jt refers to the g (1, . . . ,7) compensation variables (see Sec-
tion 3.3), SIZE jt refers to firm size, and PERFjt to firm performance (see Sec-
tion 3.4). The estimation method is explained in Section 3.5.
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3.3 Dependent Variables
Compensation is defined as the change in the wealth of the executive caused
by grants of the company to the executive or changes in the value of grants
made to the executive in the past. We thus include fixed salary, cash bonuses,
stock option grants, share grants and the change in the value of the option
and share portfolio in our study. Such an all-inclusive study goes unprece-
dented in The Netherlands, and is rarely seen in the academic literature.
3.3.1 Fixed Salary
Executives in virtually all corporations obtain a fixed salary in cash. If such
salaries were made in foreign currencies – mainly US dollars or UK pound
sterling – the value was converted into euros using the European Central
Bank’s conversion rates per July 1. To properly account for appointments or
leaves during a year, the number of months the executive worked in the focal
position has been recorded, and the salary is adjusted accordingly. The fixed
salaries are thus recorded on an annual basis.
3.3.2 Cash Bonus
Supervisory directors in European countries tend to use cash bonuses to
reward executives for good performance more so than their American coun-
terparts. Also, cash bonuses may be used to reward executives for individ-
ual performance, which is not (directly) observable from corporate outcome
measures. Bonuses have been collected ‘as they are’, without a correction for
appointments or leaves, but – where necessary – conversions to euros were
made.
3.3.3 Stock Option Grants
Stock options are the right to buy shares in the company at a pre-specified
exercise price. In our sample, 68 companies have granted stock options to one
or more executive(s) in one or more year(s). Such options typically cannot be
exercised for 3 years (the so-called vesting period), and can normally be exer-
cised in the 2 years thereafter. Options have been valued through the binomial
model and the Black-Scholes formula. The resulting values correlated with a
coefficient of 0.99. We therefore – arbitrarily – used the binomial model val-
uations in the analyses. For this valuation, six input variables are required.
1. The exercise price is taken at face value. In case options were granted on
shares by the focal company listed on a foreign stock exchange, the value
was computed with the information for this foreign listing, after which
the resulting valuation was converted into euros.
2. The number of options granted was taken at face value for unconditional
options. In The Netherlands, conditional option grants are also frequently
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observed. These conditional grants imply that there is not only a restric-
tion on exercising stock options, but also that certain performance targets
determine the number of options that is granted at the end of the vest-
ing period. Thus, say, instead of being granted 10,000 options, which may
be exercised after 3 years (unconditional options), an executive knows that
s/he will receive 7,000 options when performance is low, 10,000 when per-
formance is at target, and 13,000 options in cases of outstanding perfor-
mance. We corrected for this conditionality of grants by computing the
expected number of options to be granted at the end of the vesting period
using the equal probabilities method. This method involves the computa-
tion of the number of options to be granted at each performance level
(mentioned in the annual report). Subsequently, the computation of the
expected number is based on the assumption that all performance levels
are equally likely.
3. The expected life of the option is determined. Most options are exercised
somewhere after the end of the vesting period, but before the options
lapse. Computing the value of the options at the time they expire would
thus result in a biased estimate. We used two rules of thumb to determine
the value of the options. The first rule implies that executives exercise the
options halfway the period during which the executive is allowed to do
so. The second rule involves exercising the option when the stock price
reaches a certain threshold, which was set at twice the price of the option.
The valuations that resulted with each of these rules correlated with a
coefficient of 0.96. We therefore – arbitrarily – choose the first decision
rule.
4. The volatility of the share price was determined using closing prices in the
three preceding years.
5. The stock price at valuation date was taken as the average stock price in
a one-month window around the end of the year of valuation. Thus, the
year-end closing price was taken, which was averaged out over the period
of December 15 – January 15 to filter out possible outliers.
6. Finally, the dividend yield was computed by dividing the dividend in the
previous year by the half-year stock price in the previous year, where this
price was, again, taken as the average of 30 closing prices around July 1.
3.3.4 Stock Option Portfolio
Once options have been granted, the wealth of the executive varies with the
changes in the values of the options. Such changes, although of material
importance, have rarely been taken into account in empirical work (Hall and
Liebman 1998). Therefore, the six input parameters to the binomial model
mentioned above are updated every year the options have not been exercised
and have not lapsed. This implies, for instance, that when conditional grants
become unconditional, the effective number of stock options is recorded
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instead of the expected amount. Also, when options are exercised, the asso-
ciated profit and the reduced value of the stock option portfolio have been
noted. Stock options may or may not lapse when an executive leaves the com-
pany. This has been taken into account. The ‘stock option portfolio’ variable,
however, refers to the autonomous change in the value of the portfolio due
to updated parameter values.
3.3.5 Share Grants
A large minority of 42 companies have granted shares in one or more year(s)
to one or more executive(s). Since shares are usually granted at no cost to
the executive, the valuation is straightforward: the number of shares granted
is multiplied by the share price at the end of the year, averaged out over
thirty closing prices. In case share grants are conditional, the equal probabil-
ity method, which was also applied to stock options, has been used.
3.3.6 Share Portfolio
Comparable to option portfolios, share grants also constitute a portfolio if
the grants cannot be sold for a number of years, as is usually the case. Shares
that can be traded on the stock market, including voluntarily bought shares,
are not taken into account. This is both because stock ownership is rare in
The Netherlands (or, if present, very substantial) and because information on
the exact number of unrestricted shares owned by the executive is difficult to
obtain. If shares lapse because of termination of the executive’s contract, this
is taken into account.
3.3.7 Total Compensation
Total compensation includes all the above-mentioned variables, as well as
irregular cash payments (such as the value of perks), the profit derived from
exercising options and the – infrequent – lapsing of option and share plans.
3.4 Independent and Control Variables
According to Devers et al. (2007), company performance has been opera-
tionalized in a variety of ways in the executive pay – performance litera-
ture, including both market-based measures, such as share price increase or
total shareholder return, and accounting-based measures, such as return on
equity or return on assets. Since accounting-based measures of corporate per-
formance reflect past performance, whereas investors also factor in expected
future performance in determining the stock price, the choice of performance
measure is not conceptually unimportant (Devers et al. 2007). Empirically,
however, there is not much guidance as to which measures are frequently
used.
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TABLE 1 – PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
2005 2006
Total number of criteria 154 244
Short-term criteria (bonuses) 90 (58 per cent) 151 (62 per cent)
Financial 85 (94 per cent) 122 (81 per cent)
Non-financial 5 (6 per cent) 29 (19 per cent)
Long-term criteria (options and shares) 64 (42 per cent) 93 (38 per cent)
Financial 62 (97 per cent) 82 (88 per cent)
Non-financial 2 (3 per cent) 11 (12 per cent)
Note: The sample consists of 54 firms in 2005 and 63 firms in 2006. All AEX and most AMX
funds are included. Percentages are included in brackets.
To measure company performance, we first made an inventory of the per-
formance criteria used by the 54 largest companies in 2005 and the 63 larg-
est companies in 2006, both for short-term variable compensation (i.e., cash
bonus) and long-term (i.e., option and share) plans. The plethora of criteria
that was found indicates that a single measure of corporate performance is
likely not to capture all aspects of corporate performance on which compen-
sation contracts steer. The criteria were subdivided, as Table 1 shows, accord-
ing to – first – the type of compensation to which they applied and – second
– whether the criterion was related to financial targets or not.
The findings in Table 1 show that the majority of the performance criteria are
financial, although non-financial criteria have become more popular. In 2005,
six per cent of the short-term criteria were non-financial and three per cent
involved long-term criteria. These percentages increased to 19 and 12, respec-
tively, in 2006. Also, the findings indicate that any firm uses, on average, three
to four performance criteria. Although a large variety of targets was set, we
could create groups of performance criteria at a higher level of abstraction.
The conceptual difference between, for example, relative share price and rel-
ative total shareholder return will be small. Thus, four performance measures
were defined and applied throughout this study. These performance measures
cover 75 per cent (2006: 82 per cent) of the short-term financial performance
measures in 2005. The financial performance measures that are not covered
by our criteria refer mostly to cash flow variables or ambiguously defined cri-
teria such as ‘growth’ or ‘the value of new businesses’. For the long-term cri-
teria, the four performance measures cover 89 per cent (2006: 87 per cent) of
the financial performance criteria.
Consequently, for this study, four performance measures were used: reve-
nues, profit, relative total shareholder return, and earnings per share (EPS).
Profit is measured as operating income divided by total assets. Relative total
shareholder return includes share price appreciation and dividends relative to
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a peer group. It is not practical to use the peer groups that companies use
themselves because (1) peer groups are not always reported upon, (2) com-
panies in the peer group are usually not included in the sample, and (3) dif-
ferent peer groups tend to apply for fixed salaries as opposed to option and
share plans. Thus, four peer groups were determined through cluster analysis
based on firm size, proxied for by total assets, revenue, market value, and the
number of employees. Also, the number of years (in 2002–2006) the firm was
listed in either the index of large caps (AEX 25) or midcaps (AMX 20) was
included as a clustering variable. Total shareholder return (TSR) was com-
puted for each company in the sample, and relative TSR was defined as the
deviation of company TSR from the cluster mean. Because only four clusters
exist in the sample, the relative TSR measure only relates to crude proxies for
firm size, and is not informative with respect to outperformance relative to,
for example, the focal industry. The data was obtained from Thomsen Finan-
cial’s database Datastream.
In the analyses, firm size – measured by the number of employees – is
included as a control variable, since firm size traditionally explains a large
share of the variance in executive pay (Tosi et al. 2000). Also, director dum-
mies are added to capture individual skill differences. Note that by includ-
ing director dummies, firm and industry effects are indirectly included in the
analyses as well, since the average director effect corresponds to the firm and
industry effect.
3.5 Method
The data represent an unbalanced panel with information on 543 executives
in 5 years. The total number of observations is equal to 1,695, of which 576
are CEOs. A correlation matrix of the variables of interest is depicted in
Table 2.
The correlation coefficients among the compensation (dependent) variables
are relatively low, with the exception of the correlation between share grants
and the change in value of prior share grants (0.64). This is not surpris-
ing. Overall, there are no strong linear relationships among compensation
elements. The correlation coefficients among performance (independent) vari-
ables are fairly low as well, which indicates that each captures a relatively
unique part of company performance. The only noteworthy coefficient is the
relationship between the number of employees and revenues (0.65). It may
be that as a consequence of this covariation – probably caused by the fact
that both measures are a proxy for firm size – the individual contribution of
either variable is difficult to assess due to multicolinearity. The correlations
among compensation elements and performance measures are various, sug-
gesting that each performance measure may be a relevant predictor for some
compensation elements but not for others. No definitive catch-all measure is
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likely to appear. Note that for long-term compensation, there is a substantial
number of firms for which this is equal to zero. Out of 107 companies, 39
never issued options and 65 never issued shares as part of the compensation
arrangement of top executives. Although these observations are not included
in the analyses below, the correlation coefficients are affected by the inclusion
of the zero observations.
Subsequently, ordinary least squares regression has been performed on the
compensation elements, as well as on total compensation. We treat CEOs and
other executives separately, as Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) find that com-
pensation responds stronger to performance for managers with more respon-
sibility. In all the models, both period and director fixed effects have been
included. Although this places a burden on the degrees of freedom of each
model, absent other information, the fixed effect estimator has been found to
be most robust against contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity
(Certo and Semadeni 2006), particularly when robust standard errors are esti-
mated, as is the case here. We tested for serial correlation, but found that this
was not problematic after inclusion of period fixed effects. We do acknowl-
edge that endogeneity of the performance variables may be an issue, since
the relationship of pay to performance has also been studied widely. Meth-
ods that control for such endogeneity require, however, a time window longer
than 5 years. Also because we have less than three observations for 40 per
cent of the executives included in the sample, implementing such methods
would seriously reduce the number of observations, and introduce possible
sampling biases. In interpreting the results, it should be kept in mind that our
method does not control for endogeneity.
4 RESULTS
First, in Table 3, we present means and growth rates for the total compen-
sation variable throughout the sampling period. In Panel A, we make a dis-
tinction between three groups of firms, based on firm size. The distribution
of firms over groups is the same as in the computation of relative TSR,
with one difference: the first two groups have been merged because the vari-
ability in means over time in cluster 1 resulted in trends that do not reflect
actual pay practice. The statistics in Panel A show that pay has risen sub-
stantially, particularly if compared to the average male worker aged 55–65 in
The Netherlands, who experienced an annualized growth rate of 1.4 percent
in the same period. In Panel B, the distribution of total pay at the population
level (x C 1million) is depicted: the figure shows that fixed pay remains fairly
unchanged over the period 2002–2006, bonuses and particularly share plans
are increasingly important as pay element, and the value of stock options dif-
fers greatly throughout the observation window.
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TABLE 3 – MEANS AND GROWTH RATES FOR THE TOTAL COMPENSATION
VARIABLE THROUGHOUT THE SAMPLING PERIOD
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Growth
n C n C n C n C n C %
Panel A: mean total compensation and annualized growth rates
Large caps: CEOs 25 1,283,463 28 1,567,972 28 1,912,448 23 3,257,276 22 3,279,873 26.4
Large caps: other
executives
92 842,359 90 1,104,095 88 1,272,500 78 1,992,834 87 1,684,097 18.9
Midcaps: CEOs 30 536,477 29 658,689 29 804,141 30 951,560 31 778,620 9.8
Midcaps: other
executives
63 411,112 61 530,463 65 503,924 60 681,558 70 601,675 10.0
Small caps: CEOs 56 300,071 60 340,050 60 356,178 59 407,000 59 411,259 8.2
Small caps: other
executives
79 276,400 71 294,000 66 319,447 65 379,000 71 404,975 10.0











2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
cash bonus options shares
Table 4 displays the results of the regression analyses for CEOs. All esti-
mations reach statistical significance, but the shareholder value change (SHV)
model only at the 10 percent level. Also note that as only non-zero observa-
tions are included in the OPTG, OPTV, SHG and SHV models, the results
relate to firms having opted for these compensation components only. In The
Netherlands, share plans have become particularly popular since 2005. In
2002–2006, a total of 173million euro has been granted to executives as part
of their compensation plan, roughly two-thirds of which in 2005–2006. The
number of observations for share plan models is thus limited, which makes
them meaningful – with 96 and 59 observations, respectively –, but only
for a small subset of observations. Most models explain a significant share
of the variance in the respective dependent variables, although we should
note that the benchmark model is the constant-only estimation. The adjusted
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TABLE 4 – REGRESSION ANALYSES: CEOs
SAL BON OPTG OPTV
Constant 12.77 0.03 ** 8.23 0.86 ** 10.28 0.62 ** 15.99 0.03 **
Size 2.43 1.31 + −13.10 33.70 9.99 14.56 1.80 0.75 *
Revenue −3.54 2.49 154.00 98.90 4.68 2.88 0.03 0.09
RTSR −0.01 0.02 0.62 0.56 1.50 0.44 ** 0.06 0.03 +
Profit 0.11 0.14 5.87 3.18 + 0.20 3.39 −0.31 0.28
EPS 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.28 0.16 + 0.00 0.01
AR(1)
n 162 166 73 81
nT 509 516 175 213
# 0 4 136 385 (omitted) 340 (omitted)
Overall F 24.43 ** 3.67 ** 6.45 ** 1.63 **
Overall R2 0.89 0.47 0.72 0.21
Perf. F 0.79 2.01 + 4.23 ** 1.41
SHG SHV TOTAL
Constant 12.04 0.44 ** 14.27 0.23 ** 15.61 0.15 **
Size 13.99 5.78 * −2.51 3.09 9.76 6.62
Revenue −1.20 1.22 0.55 0.46 −1.84 7.22
RTSR 0.07 0.22 −0.33 0.21 0.05 0.03 +
Profit −0.16 1.97 −0.03 1.28 −0.01 0.05
EPS −0.23 0.09 * 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01
AR(1) 0.35 0.17 *
n 41 35 134
nT 96 59 348
# 0 472 (omitted) 504 (omitted) 1
Overall F 34.96 ** 2.08 + 6.53 **
Overall R2 0.95 0.44 0.69
Perf. F 1.73 1.72 1.30
Estimated equation COMPgi j t =β0 +β1*SIZE j t +β2, . . . , β5*PERF j t + ε j t , where COMP refers
to salary (SAL), cash bonus (BON), option grants (OPTG), option portfolio value changes
(OPTV), share grants (SHG), share portfolio value changes (SHV), and total compensation
(TOTAL). Explanatory variables are the number of employees (SIZE), firm revenues (REVE-
NUE), relative total shareholder return (RTSR), profit (PROFIT), and earnings per share (EPS)
Estimation is OLS with two-way fixed effects. AR(1) terms were included whenever the Durbin-
Watson test indicated this was necessary (period fixed effects were then dropped). White diagonal
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics. The statistics panel refers to
the number of cross-sections included (n), the number of observations (nT), the number of obser-
vations for which the dependent variable is zero (#0), the result of the F-test where the bench-
mark is the fixed-effects only model (F), the adjusted overall R2 (Overall R2), and the F-test for
the joint significance of the firm performance variables (Perf. F). The dependent variable was log-
transformed.
** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10.
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R-squared therefore includes the variance explained by the director fixed
effects.
A test on the joint significance of the performance parameters is rejected
in most cases, except for the option grants (OPTG) and bonus (BON) mod-
els. This indicates that CEO compensation in The Netherlands is only weakly
related to company performance, at best. As may be expected, firm size is
positively associated with salary. Also, we find some associations between per-
formance variables and compensation components: profit is positively associ-
ated with bonus, relative TSR is positively associated with option grants and
option value changes, and earnings per share are positively associated with
option grants. We also find a negative association between earnings per share
and share grants. It is unclear what explains this shift from share grants to
option grants for CEOs who experience a decline in earnings per share.
Table 5 exhibits the results for the other executives. In general, the statis-
tical power of these models is higher than that of the CEO models, possibly
because of the larger number of observations. As with the results presented
in Table 4, the variance explained in each of the models is typically substan-
tial. F-tests for the joint significance of the performance parameters lead to
the rejection of this hypothesis for the salary model only. Thus, performance
tends to be significantly associated with other executives’ compensation. It is
relevant to note that the significance of performance variables in the aggre-
gate is stronger for compensation components than for total compensation.
This may be caused by the estimation of component models OPTG, OPTV,
SHG and SHV for non-zero observations only.
We find a myriad of associations between performance variables and com-
pensation components. The cash bonus is positively associated with profit and
RTSR, whereas RTSR and revenues (RTSR and earnings per share) are asso-
ciated with the value of option (share) grants. Option value changes are asso-
ciated with revenues, RTSR and profit, whereas share value changes
are associated with revenues and RTSR. Total compensation is associated
with RTSR and revenues. With one exception (the effect of profit on option
grants), all performance parameter estimates are positive.
A final result follows from the comparison of Tables 4 and 5. For no sin-
gle model, the results for CEOs and other executives were qualitatively the
same. These results are striking, since the components of pay contracts tend
to be the same: other executives participate in the same option plans as their
CEO, or do not participate in such plans. Never do other executives have
separate option plans. Thus, it could be expected that the models for other
executives exhibit weaker pay-for-performance relationships, but not that dif-
ferent performance measures show up as drivers of compensation levels. An
explanation for this finding may lie in the performance criteria. Often, other
executives are rewarded based on divisional performance, whereas CEO com-
pensation is tied to overall firm performance.
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TABLE 5 – REGRESSION ANALYSES: OTHER EXECUTIVES
SAL BON OPTG OPTV
Constant 12.66 0.10 ** 8.40 1.13 ** 9.48 0.75 ** 15.75 0.05 **
Size 1.86 1.92 6.86 24.62 18.65 12.97 2.74 1.03 **
Revenue 1.34 2.25 −12.74 33.74 40.60 10.40 ** 0.44 0.67
RTSR 0.02 0.04 1.32 0.42 ** 0.95 0.27 ** 0.04 0.02 *
Profit 0.30 0.30 12.93 3.43 ** 1.46 1.74 −0.39 0.17 *
EPS −0.05 0.03 + −0.26 0.19 0.00 0.10 −0.01 0.01
AR(1)
n 381 381 187 175
nT 1,023 1,023 426 420
# 0 13 282 651 (omitted) 651 (omitted)
Overall F 44.88 ** 3.74 ** 6.02 ** 2.09 **
Overall R2 0.94 0.51 0.70 0.32
Perf. F 1.51 7.04 ** 8.02 ** 4.52 **
SHG SHV TOTAL
Constant 10.97 0.73 ** 13.57 0.28 ** 15.37 0.09 **
Size 24.39 8.41 ** −13.92 4.66 ** 4.77 2.14 *
Revenue −13.75 15.19 19.91 8.27 * 4.22 2.44 +
RTSR 0.95 0.34 ** −0.22 0.12 + 0.05 0.02 *
Profit −2.46 1.96 −0.21 2.64 0.14 0.14
EPS −0.29 0.17 + 0.13 0.10 −0.01 0.01
AR(1)
n 133 94 382
nT 298 201 1,022
# 0 805 (omitted) 904 (omitted) 12
Overall F 4.62 ** 2.46 ** 3.24 **
Overall R2 0.63 0.43 0.46
Perf. F 2.46 * 4.08 ** 2.09 +
Estimated equation COMPgi j t =β0 +β1*SIZE j t +β2, . . . , β5*PERF j t + ε j t , where COMP refers
to salary (SAL), cash bonus (BON), option grants (OPTG), option portfolio value changes
(OPTV), share grants (SHG), share portfolio value changes (SHV), and total compensation
(TOTAL). Explanatory variables are the number of employees (SIZE), firm revenues (REVE-
NUE), relative total shareholder return (RTSR), profit (PROFIT), and earnings per share (EPS)
Estimation is OLS with two-way fixed effects. AR(1) terms were included whenever the Durbin-
Watson test indicated this was necessary (period fixed effects were then dropped). White diagonal
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics. The statistics panel refers to
the number of cross-sections included (n), the number of observations (nT), the number of obser-
vations for which the dependent variable is zero (#0), the result of the F-test where the bench-
mark is the fixed-effects only model (F), the adjusted overall R2 (Overall R2), and the F-test for
the joint significance of the firm performance variables (Perf. F). The dependent variable was log-
transformed.
** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10.
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5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In the introduction, we posited four contributions of this paper to the liter-
ature: (1) to study the performance sensitivity of executive compensation in
a non-US institutional context, here The Netherlands; (2) to include a great
amount of detail, particularly to study non-CEO executives and to include the
changes in value of option and share portfolios held by executives in the com-
putation of performance sensitivity; (3) to take into account that option and
share grants are often made conditional on the achievement of performance
targets; and (4) to include performance measures other than total shareholder
return. We discuss the results of our empirical analysis in light of these four
contributions. Also, we mention policy prescriptions where relevant, and dis-
cuss more general avenues of future research.
With respect to the first contribution, this paper is among the first to doc-
ument pay for performance relationships for The Netherlands. The relevance
of such a study may come from institutional differences. For example, while
share grants are common in the United States, they have become popular in
The Netherlands only since the turn of the millennium. For our sample, stock
grants and stock option plans represent a majority of remuneration in only
7–33 per cent of the companies, whereby the percentage increased in later
years, which suggests some convergence to American practices. Such differ-
ences in pay structure call for research into the effect of governance sys-
tems on executive compensation. While performance sensitivity is present in
share plans by definition, it is to a larger extent an element upon which the
board of directors decides in The Netherlands. The cash bonus is still the
core element in most European executive compensation package in spite of
an increased Americanization of pay packages (Oxelheim and Randøy 2006).
This bonus may well be contingent upon different performance criteria, and
may be associated with different performance sensitivity than share-based
components. This possibly indicates the influence of shareholders on the pay
setting in the two different institutional contexts, or may be the consequence
of different tax regimes. Thus, the study of other contexts than the United
States remains warranted. Our findings are in line with those of Otten et al.
(2008), although we are able to document relationships between market mea-
sures of company performance and long-term incentive compensation at a
lower level of aggregation. Also, because of the amount of detail included
in the present study, we may be able to explain the negative performance
sensitivity which Duffhues and Kabir (2008) found: the focus of their paper
being on the cash bonus, mostly, their study may fail to capture the trade-off
between various compensation components in rewarding executives for differ-
ent aspects of firm performance.
The second contribution of this paper lies in the amount of detail included.
Our results show that CEO total compensation is weakly related to
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performance: a joint effect of the four performance criteria was not found,
while relative total shareholder return by itself showed some relationship with
total compensation. For other executives, the pay-performance relations were
found to be much stronger: revenues and RTSR are predictors of total com-
pensation for non-CEO executives. The difference between the findings for
CEOs and other executives points to the relevance of separately evaluating
the pay for performance nexus for these positions. Different theoretical frame-
works may well be relevant for understanding pay for performance for CEOs
versus other executives. Two theories can be mentioned here. First, manage-
rial power theory suggests that the performance sensitivity of compensation
depends negatively on the power of the executive. After all, if executives have
the power to behave opportunistically – as is assumed in agency theory – then
why will they not have the power to influence the parameters of their com-
pensation contracts (Bebchuk and Fried 2003)? Thus, power differentials may
well explain the performance sensitivity of pay. Second, it follows from tour-
nament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981) that other executives are not only
motivated by their compensation contracts, but also by the possibility to be
promoted to CEO. The CEO does not have internal promotion options, but
may have lower pay for performance sensitivity to compensate for a strong
outside option, given that individuals dislike the variability of outcomes. To
what extent managerial power and tournament theories may explain our find-
ings remains to be determined, but future research could aim to explicitly for-
mulate position-specific hypotheses for pay for performance sensitivity.
Our second contribution – including a large amount of detail – also relates
to the inclusion of multiple components of pay: salary, cash bonus, option
grants, option value changes, share grants, and share value changes. Decom-
posing total compensation indeed adds value, as – for other executives, for
example – the effect of profit on the cash bonus does not carry over to
total compensation. Thus, viewing the total compensation results in isola-
tion, one would be tempted to erroneously suggest that profit is an irrele-
vant performance criterion. As we will explain below, various performance
criteria may well be used jointly to reward different performances, and these
strong effects at the level of compensation components may be diluted in a
total compensation model. An indication that this indeed happens may be
inferred from the generally low correlation coefficients among the compensa-
tion components. Apparently, different targets are rewarded through different
pay elements. Finally, with respect to our second contribution, the descriptive
statistics demonstrate that the share and option portfolios executives hold are
substantial on average, particularly for stock options. As so-called portfolio
incentives (Hall and Liebman 1998) emanate from these holdings, their inclu-
sion in pay for performance studies is warranted.
There is a generally positive relationship between relative total shareholder
return and the various long-term compensation elements. Other variables are
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also found to be important, though, notably the negative effect of profitabil-
ity on option value change for CEOs. We suggest that results of non-market
based performance measures on the value changes of options and shares are
caused by the conditionality of grants. Such plans may, and in The Nether-
lands do, prescribe, for example, that stock options will only definitively be
granted (at the end of the vesting period) when specific accounting-based per-
formance targets have been met. We are not aware of studies that correct the
value of options for the possibility that not all options will definitively be
granted at the end of the vesting period (neither is there a good overview
of how important this problem is). Given the recent emphasis on CEO stock
holdings and CEO stock ownership (Hall and Liebman 1998), this correction
may be gaining importance: for stock (option) plans, a relationship between
pay and performance exists almost by definition, and not taking the condi-
tionality into account inflates the performance-relatedness of compensation.
While we cannot directly derive from our results to what extent the condi-
tionality affects the value of the share and option portfolio, to take account
of the conditionality of share or option grants may reflect an interesting area
of subsequent research.
The fourth and final contribution of our research is to include multiple
performance criteria in our study. Our analysis shows that a plethora of per-
formance criteria is used, which can be summarized by only four perfor-
mance measures. Table 2 shows that over one hundred criteria were found in
the annual reports of the largest Dutch corporations, but our four indepen-
dent variables – revenues, profits, earnings per share, and total shareholder
return – captured 75–89 per cent of these criteria. We documented a vari-
ety of relationships between these performance variables and the various com-
pensation elements. For example, we both found that market-based measures
may also be relevant for bonuses, and that accounting-based measures may
explain some of the variance in stock grants and stock option plans. Our
study thus both questions the results of previous efforts that relied on a sin-
gle performance measure, and calls for the development of additional theory
that fosters our understanding of which compensation elements are used to
steer on specific corporate outcomes. The distinction between line of sight
and goal agreement is relevant here: some performance criteria – e.g., RTSR
– score high on goal agreement in that the objectives of shareholder and
managers are aligned. Other performance criteria – e.g., revenues – are more
directly under control of the executive, and thus are characterized by a high
line of sight. The appropriate mix of performance criteria has not been stud-
ied, to date, as the focus in the literature rests with market-based performance
criteria.
Overall, two general questions seem to arise from our study. Firstly, it is
unclear what drives the choice of the various pay arrangements. We believe
that context, particularly the corporate (governance) institutional framework,
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country setting (regulation, fiscal regime, and the like) and social network
may be of importance. However, additional systematic evidence about the
relationship between context and pay arrangements is needed. More research
in various national settings is necessary to investigate the contextual deter-
minants of the adoption of the various pay structures and, subsequently, the
choice of performance criteria. The variety in national institutional settings
may have a predictive value for the determination of compensation contracts,
yet research in this area is limited.
Secondly, the effect of pay arrangements on executive behaviors and firm
outcomes requires more investigation. A fairly large stream of literature has
developed to show the effects of long-term compensation, suggesting mostly
that greed may also be fed instead of being contained by long-term compen-
sation dominated contracts. The effects of bonuses, which are more impor-
tant in The Netherlands and other European countries (see, e.g., Oxelheim
and Randøy 2006), on executive behavior have much less widely been stud-
ied. This, too, deserves attention in future work.
Finally, our research has important implications for policy-makers. In The
Netherlands and elsewhere, the recent financial crisis has led to calls for caps
on executive compensation, more transparency on the pay-setting process and
stronger pay for performance when the firm operates in the red. Particularly
in Europe, politicians aim to coordinate legislative initiatives across national –
and thus institutional – borders. While such efforts may prevent institutional
competition, because firms would face similar executive compensation regu-
lations regardless of their location, they may also result in efficiency losses.
This is, first, the case because any regulation is not able to capture the details
of incentive contracts which we have shown to be present. Second, interna-
tional coordination results in a loss of policy-making freedom, which makes
the policy measures ill-matched with the national institutional framework.
While a cap on stock option and share grants may not strongly affect the
incentives of an average Dutch executive, as variable compensation through a
cash bonus outweighs the importance of stocks and options, the effect in the
United Kingdom is likely to be much larger. Also, measures that target one
compensation component may also impact other compensation elements. For
example, a recent legislative change in The Netherlands has made share com-
pensation less attractive, and leads to compensation still being tied to stock
market performance yet paid out in cash. A single policy measure is therefore
likely to have a myriad of effects, which are largely unpredictable because of
the shortcomings of the empirical pay for performance literature, to date.
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